Draft — for discussion
Indicative valuation analysis
Untitled company
Weighted indicated equity value$16,739Indicated range $12,842 to $21,648
This document is an indicative analysis prepared from information supplied by the preparer. It is not an appraisal, valuation opinion, or fairness opinion, and has not been prepared under any recognised valuation standard by a credentialed valuer. It must not be relied upon as the sole basis for any investment, financing, tax, or litigation decision, and does not constitute an offer or solicitation in respect of any security. Read with the basis of preparation and limiting conditions at the end of this document.
1Basis of preparation
| Purpose | Indicative valuation to inform a negotiated equity transaction |
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| Standard of value | Fair market value |
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| Premise of value | Going concern |
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| Valuation date | 2026-08-08 |
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| Sources of information | Management-prepared financial statements for the periods stated, management forecasts, and publicly available market multiple data selected by the preparer. |
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| Scope limitations | No independent audit, site visit, asset inspection, or verification of management information has been performed. |
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2Subject company and approach selection
The subject is a scaling, high growth business operating in saas / subscription software. Repeatable sales motion, burning to grow. Net revenue retention and the Rule of 40 explain more of the multiple than growth alone. Methods have been selected on that basis. Where a sector convention overrides the stage default, this is noted in the table below.
| Method | Approach | Applicability | Reason for selection or exclusion |
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| Comparable company multiples | Market | Primary | Enough public or private peers exist that the market's own pricing is informative. Price on forward ARR, not trailing revenue, and adjust the multiple for net revenue retention and gross margin before applying it. |
| Discounted cash flow | Income | Primary | Cash flows are forecastable with enough confidence that the discounting does real work. Customer acquisition cost is expensed today for cash flow arriving over years, so early-year free cash flow understates economics. Model cohort contribution, not accounting profit. |
| First Chicago (scenario weighted) | Forward-looking | Primary | Explicitly separates the success case from the base and failure cases instead of averaging them into mush. |
| Precedent transactions | Market | Primary | Actual deals for similar assets set a floor and ceiling on what a buyer has paid. |
| Venture capital method | Forward-looking | Primary | Works backwards from a plausible exit to what an investor can pay today at target return. |
| Adjusted net asset value | Asset | Reference only | Value here is intangible and operational; book assets understate it badly. |
| Berkus method | Early-stage heuristic | Reference only | Once revenue exists, milestone heuristics are strictly worse than the data you now have. |
| Capitalisation of earnings | Income | Reference only | Earnings are not stable enough for a single-period capitalisation to mean anything. |
| Dividend discount model | Income | Reference only | No dividend, or a dividend unrelated to earnings capacity. The model has nothing to discount. |
| Liquidation value | Asset | Reference only | Only meaningful as a floor; not the operating answer for a going concern. |
| Replacement cost | Asset | Reference only | Cost to build says nothing about value once a market has priced the output. |
| Risk factor summation | Early-stage heuristic | Reference only | Superseded by actual operating data. |
| Scorecard (Payne) method | Early-stage heuristic | Reference only | Superseded by actual operating data. |
| Seller's discretionary earnings multiple | Market | Reference only | The company has institutional management; SDE add-backs would be fiction. |
3Assumption register
Every input used in this analysis, with its definition and the principal risk of misstatement. Figures marked as currency are stated in USD thousands.
Financial base
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
|---|
| Revenue (last twelve months) | $12,000 | All the money the business billed customers over the past twelve months, before any costs are taken out. Also called sales or turnover. Risk: Money received is not the same as revenue. A twelve-month contract paid upfront is one year of revenue, not one month. |
| EBITDA | $2,400 | Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation. Roughly, the cash profit from operating the business, before paying lenders, the tax office, or writing down equipment. Risk: It is not free cash flow. A business that must constantly replace machinery converts far less EBITDA into spendable cash. |
| Net income | $1,500 | The final profit after every cost, including interest and tax. What actually belongs to shareholders for the year. Risk: Easily distorted by one-off gains, asset sales, or unusual tax items. Strip those out first. |
| Cash and equivalents | $800 | Money in the bank plus anything convertible to cash within days. Risk: Some of this may be needed to run the business day to day. Only genuinely surplus cash should be added to value. |
| Total debt | $3,000 | Everything the business owes to lenders: bank loans, overdrafts, finance leases, shareholder loans. Risk: Include lease liabilities. Excluding them makes a leased-premises business look cheaper than an owned-premises one for no real reason. |
| Shares outstanding | 1000 | The number of ownership units the company has issued. Risk: Include options and convertible instruments that are likely to convert, or you will overstate value per share. |
Discounted cash flow — forecast
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
|---|
| Forecast years | 5 | How many years you will project in detail before switching to a single terminal figure for everything after. Risk: Longer is not more accurate. Beyond five years most forecasts are extrapolation dressed as analysis. |
| Year 1 revenue growth | 18.0% | How much bigger you expect sales to be next year, as a percentage. Risk: Founders' first-year numbers are optimistic by a wide margin. If last year grew 20%, next year is unlikely to grow 80%. |
| Final year revenue growth | 5.0% | The growth rate in the last forecast year. The model fades from year one to this figure in a straight line. Risk: Ending at a high growth rate then applying a perpetuity assumption compounds optimism twice. |
| Starting EBITDA margin | 20.0% | EBITDA as a percentage of revenue today. If you make 20 of profit on 100 of sales, the margin is 20%. Risk: Margins rarely jump. Assuming they double over five years needs a stated reason. |
| Final year EBITDA margin | 24.0% | The profit margin you expect once the business reaches its forecast scale. Risk: Assuming a margin no competitor has ever reached is the single most common way a forecast becomes fiction. |
| D&A as % of revenue | 4.0% | Depreciation and amortisation: the accounting charge that spreads the cost of equipment and intangible assets over their useful life. No cash leaves the business when it is recorded. Risk: It affects the tax bill, which is why the model subtracts it and then adds it straight back. |
| Capex as % of revenue | 5.0% | Capital expenditure: cash spent buying or replacing long-lived assets such as machines, vehicles, or buildings. Risk: This is real cash leaving. A business where capex permanently exceeds depreciation is consuming more than it earns. |
| Working capital as % of revenue change | 10.0% | As sales grow, more cash gets tied up in unpaid customer invoices and stock on the shelf. This says how much extra cash gets trapped for every extra unit of sales. Risk: Some businesses are negative here — customers pay upfront — which is a genuine cash advantage worth modelling. |
| Tax rate | 22.0% | The percentage of profit paid in corporate income tax. Risk: Use the rate you expect to pay in future, not a rate temporarily reduced by loss carry-forwards. |
Discounted cash flow — discount rate
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
|---|
| Risk-free rate | 4.2% | The return you could earn with essentially no risk, used as the floor for every other return. Risk: Match the currency. Using a US Treasury yield to value a Nepali rupee business omits inflation and country risk. |
| Beta | 1.25 | How much this business's fortunes swing relative to the overall market. A beta of 1.0 moves with the market, 1.5 swings half again as hard, 0.7 is steadier. Risk: Private companies have no beta. You are borrowing one from listed peers, which is an assumption, not a measurement. |
| Equity risk premium | 5.5% | The extra annual return investors demand for owning shares rather than government bonds. Risk: Add a country risk premium for markets with weaker legal protection or currency instability. |
| Size premium | 2.5% | Extra return demanded because small companies are riskier and harder to sell than large ones. Risk: Skipping this is the most common way private valuations come out too high. |
| Company-specific premium | 1.5% | Extra return for risks unique to this business: one customer producing half the revenue, one founder holding all the relationships, a single supplier, an unresolved lawsuit. Risk: This is the most subjective input in the whole model. State your reasons for it in writing. |
| Pre-tax cost of debt | 8.0% | The interest rate the business pays, or would pay, to borrow. Risk: Use today's borrowing rate, not a legacy rate from a cheaper era. |
| Equity weight in capital structure | 70.0% | What share of the business's funding comes from owners rather than lenders. 70 means 70% equity, 30% debt. Risk: Using the current mix locks in a temporary financing position as though it were permanent. |
Discounted cash flow — terminal value
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
|---|
| Terminal method | gordon | How to value everything that happens after your forecast ends. Perpetuity assumes the business grows slowly forever; exit multiple assumes it is sold at a market price. Risk: This one choice routinely moves the answer by 20% or more. Run both. |
| Terminal growth rate | 2.5% | How fast the business grows every year after the forecast period, forever. Risk: Above about 3% you are assuming the business eventually outgrows the entire economy, which cannot happen. |
| Exit EV/EBITDA multiple | 8x | The price, expressed as a multiple of profit, that a buyer would pay for the business at the end of the forecast. Risk: Assuming a higher exit multiple than the entry multiple is assuming the market re-rates in your favour. Justify it or drop it. |
| Mid-year discounting convention | true | Assumes cash arrives steadily through the year rather than all on the last day, which is closer to reality. Risk: It raises value by roughly half a year of discounting. Fine to use, but be consistent. |
Comparable company multiples
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
|---|
| Peer EV / Revenue | 2.2x | How many times their annual sales similar companies are currently valued at. Risk: Enterprise value includes debt. Do not compare it to a share price. |
| Peer EV / EBITDA | 9.5x | How many times their cash profit similar companies are valued at. Risk: A peer set chosen at a market peak will price your company at a market peak. |
| Peer P / E | 16x | How many times their after-tax profit similar companies' shares trade at. Risk: Compare like with like on accounting standards and tax regimes. |
| Discount for lack of marketability | 20.0% | A reduction applied because a stake in a private company cannot be sold quickly, unlike a listed share. Risk: Do not apply this on top of a multiple that was already derived from private transactions — that double counts. |
| Control premium adjustment | 0.0% | An increase applied when the buyer gets control of the business and can change how it is run. Risk: Only add this if the stake genuinely confers control. A 30% holding usually does not. |
| Range spread around the point estimate | 20.0% | How wide a band to show around the calculated figure, reflecting how uncertain the multiple is. Risk: A narrow band on a thin peer set projects false confidence. |
Precedent transactions
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
|---|
| Transaction EV / EBITDA | 11.5x | The multiple actually paid in recent purchases of similar businesses. Risk: Deal multiples are higher than trading multiples because buyers pay for control and synergies. |
| Synergy haircut | 15.0% | The portion of that deal price that came from savings only that particular buyer could achieve, which you should not count on. Risk: If you are selling to a financial buyer with no synergies, the haircut should be large. |
Capitalisation of earnings
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
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| Normalised annual earnings | $2,100 | A single sustainable profit figure, after removing one-off items, owner distortions, and anything that will not repeat. Risk: Normalisation decides the answer here. An above-market rent paid to the owner's own property company must be corrected. |
| Required rate of return | 18.0% | The annual return an investor needs to justify buying this business rather than something safer. Risk: For a small private business this is usually 15–30%, far above listed market returns. |
| Sustainable growth rate | 3.0% | How fast profit can keep growing indefinitely. Risk: If this approaches the required return, the calculated value runs to infinity. That is the model failing, not the business succeeding. |
Seller's discretionary earnings
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
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| Net profit before tax | $900 | Profit as reported, after all expenses but before income tax. Risk: For owner-run businesses the reported figure is often deliberately low for tax reasons. That is what the add-backs correct. |
| Owner's compensation | $600 | Everything the working owner takes: salary, bonus, dividends taken instead of salary, pension contributions. Risk: Add back only one owner's pay. If two family members genuinely work full time, the buyer must replace both. |
| Discretionary / personal expenses | $120 | Costs run through the business that a new owner would not incur: personal vehicle, family phone plans, personal travel. Risk: Buyers challenge these hard, and rightly. Anything you cannot evidence will be removed from the price. |
| Interest expense | $180 | Interest paid on business borrowings. Risk: Added back because the buyer will arrange their own financing, not inherit yours. |
| Tax | $260 | Corporate income tax charged for the year. Risk: Added back because tax depends on the buyer's own structure and circumstances. |
| Depreciation and amortisation | $240 | Accounting charge spreading the cost of equipment and intangibles over time. No cash moves. Risk: Adding it back is standard, but a business with heavy real equipment replacement needs will not sustain the earnings implied. |
| SDE multiple | 3x | How many years of owner earnings a buyer will pay. Risk: The multiple rises with recurring revenue, transferable systems, and low owner dependence. It falls sharply without them. |
Berkus method
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
|---|
| Cap per category | $500 | The maximum value you allow any single milestone to add. Five categories, so the method's ceiling is five times this. Risk: The cap is a convention, not a measurement. Two honest analysts using different caps land far apart. |
| Sound idea | $400 | Value assigned for having a coherent concept that addresses a real problem. Risk: Nearly every founder scores themselves at the cap here. Almost none should. |
| Prototype | $450 | Value for having something that actually works, which reduces the risk that the technology cannot be built. Risk: A demo is not a prototype. Score what survives contact with a real user. |
| Quality management team | $500 | Value for having people capable of executing, which is usually the biggest single risk before revenue. Risk: A strong CV in a different industry retires less risk than it appears to. |
| Strategic relationships | $300 | Value for partnerships, distribution agreements, or design customers that reduce the risk nobody wants the product. Risk: A letter of intent with no money attached retires very little risk. |
| Product rollout or first sales | $250 | Value for having shipped and sold, which reduces production and adoption risk. Risk: Friends-and-family sales do not count as market validation. |
Scorecard method
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
|---|
| Regional average pre-money | $3,000 | The typical valuation, before new money goes in, for comparable-stage startups in your region. Risk: The whole answer scales directly with this number. Guessing it makes every factor weight decorative. |
| Strength of management team | 1.25x | How the founding team compares to the typical funded team locally. 1.00 is average, 1.25 is 25% better, 0.75 is worse. Risk: This factor carries the largest weight, so inflation here inflates everything. |
| Size of the opportunity | 1.1x | How large the addressable market is compared to a typical funded startup's market. Risk: Top-down market sizing that starts with a national statistic and applies a percentage is almost always wrong. |
| Product or technology | 1x | How differentiated and defensible the product is relative to the average funded company. Risk: Being first is not defensibility. Being hard to copy is. |
| Competitive environment | 0.9x | Whether the competitive landscape is friendlier or harsher than typical. Risk: No visible competition usually means no market, not a clear run. |
| Marketing, sales, partnerships | 0.8x | How strong the route to customers is compared to a typical funded company. Risk: A plan to hire a sales team is not a sales channel. |
| Need for additional investment | 1x | Whether this company needs less further funding than typical, which is favourable, or more, which is not. Risk: Scores above 1.00 here mean less capital needed, which is the opposite of how founders often read it. |
| Other factors | 1x | Anything material not captured above: regulatory position, timing, unusual assets. Risk: Leave at 1.00 unless you can name the specific factor. |
Risk factor summation
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
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| Base pre-money value | $3,000 | The starting valuation for a typical comparable company, before adjusting for the twelve risks. Risk: Get this wrong and all twelve adjustments are decoration on a wrong number. |
| Value per risk notch | $250 | How much value each single step of risk adjustment moves the valuation. Risk: The increment is arbitrary and does not scale with company size. Treat the output as very approximate. |
| Management risk | 1 | |
| Stage of business | 0 | |
| Legislation / political risk | 1 | |
| Manufacturing risk | 0 | |
| Sales and marketing risk | -1 | |
| Funding / capital raising risk | 0 | |
| Competition risk | 1 | |
| Technology risk | 0 | |
| Litigation risk | 0 | |
| International risk | -1 | |
| Reputation risk | 1 | |
| Exit value risk | 0 | |
Venture capital method
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
|---|
| Years to exit | 5 | How long until the business is sold or listed, turning the investment into cash. Risk: Longer horizons demand a higher exit value to hit the same return, which lowers today's value sharply. |
| Revenue at exit | $40,000 | What annual sales will be in the year the business is sold. Risk: This single number, multiplied by an assumed multiple, drives the entire answer. |
| Exit revenue multiple | 3x | The multiple of sales a buyer will pay at exit. Risk: A mature, slower-growing business earns a lower multiple than a fast-growing one. Do not carry today's growth multiple to exit. |
| Target IRR | 40.0% | The annual percentage return the investor requires. Venture funds target high rates because most of their investments return nothing. Risk: This is the investor's mandate, not a measurement of your business. It reflects their portfolio maths. |
| Expected future dilution | 35.0% | How much today's investor's ownership will shrink as later funding rounds issue new shares. Risk: Ignoring dilution systematically overstates what an investor can pay today. |
| This round's investment | $2,000 | The amount of new money going into the business in this round. Risk: Pre-money value equals post-money value minus this. The distinction decides how much of the company you give away. |
First Chicago scenarios
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
|---|
| Years to exit | 5 | How long until the business is sold or listed, turning the investment into cash. Risk: Longer horizons demand a higher exit value to hit the same return, which lowers today's value sharply. |
| Required IRR | 35.0% | The annual return required across all scenarios, used to discount each exit value back to today. Risk: Using a venture-level rate here and also modelling a failure case penalises the same risk twice. |
| Upside exit value | $120,000 | What the business sells for if things go extremely well. Risk: This case carries most of the weighted answer despite its low probability, so it deserves the most scrutiny. |
| Upside probability | 15.0% | The chance the upside case happens, in percent. Risk: The three probabilities must sum to 100 or the result is not an expected value. |
| Base exit value | $40,000 | What the business sells for in a solid but unspectacular outcome, usually a trade sale. Risk: This is the most likely outcome for most companies, so do not treat it as the pessimistic case. |
| Base probability | 50.0% | The chance the base case happens, in percent. Risk: For most startups this is well under half. |
| Downside exit value | $5,000 | What is recovered if the business fails: an acquihire, an asset sale, or nothing. Risk: Entering a comfortable downside number is the main way this method gets misused. |
| Downside probability | 35.0% | The chance of the downside case, in percent. Risk: If your downside probability is under 30% at early stage, check it against actual base rates. |
Balance sheet
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
|---|
| Book value of assets | $9,000 | Everything the business owns, valued as the accounts record it: original cost less accumulated depreciation. Risk: Book value is a historical record, not a current market price. It is rarely what anything would sell for. |
| Fair value adjustment | $1,200 | The difference between what assets are recorded at and what they would actually fetch today. Can be positive or negative. Risk: Land and buildings are usually understated. Receivables and inventory are usually overstated. |
| Off-balance-sheet intangibles | $800 | Valuable things the accounts do not show: brand, internally built software, customer lists, trained workforce. Risk: Accounting rules expense these as they are created, so they never appear as assets despite being real. |
| Total liabilities | $4,200 | Everything the business owes: loans, supplier invoices, taxes due, lease obligations, provisions. Risk: Include deferred tax that would fall due on the fair value uplift you just added above. |
Liquidation
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
|---|
| Cash | $800 | Money in the bank on the day of wind-up. Risk: Recovers at full value, unlike everything else here. |
| Accounts receivable | $2,100 | Money customers owe you but have not yet paid. Risk: Collection rates fall sharply once customers know the business is closing. |
| Receivable recovery | 75.0% | The percentage of those unpaid invoices you would actually collect in a wind-up. Risk: Age the receivables. Anything over 120 days old rarely converts. |
| Inventory | $1,900 | Stock held for sale or use in production. Risk: Carried at cost in the accounts, which is rarely what it fetches in a forced sale. |
| Inventory recovery | 45.0% | The percentage of stock value recovered when sold quickly. Risk: Perishable, seasonal, or bespoke stock can recover close to nothing. |
| Furniture, fixtures, equipment | $2,600 | Desks, machinery, vehicles, fit-out. Risk: Leasehold fit-out that cannot be removed has almost no recovery value. |
| Equipment recovery | 30.0% | The percentage of equipment value recovered at auction. Risk: Specialised equipment with few possible buyers recovers least. |
| Real estate | $0 | Land and buildings owned outright. Risk: Only include property you own. Leased premises are a liability here, not an asset. |
| Real estate recovery | 85.0% | The percentage of market value achieved in a fast sale. Risk: The one asset class that usually holds most of its value under pressure. |
| Intangibles and goodwill | $1,500 | Brand, customer relationships, and goodwill recorded from past acquisitions. Risk: Goodwill exists only while the business operates. |
| Intangible recovery | 5.0% | The percentage of intangible value recovered when the business stops trading. Risk: Registered patents and domain names may sell. Goodwill will not. |
| Wind-down costs | $600 | What it costs to close: redundancy payments, legal and insolvency fees, lease termination, storage, auctioneer commission. Risk: Routinely underestimated. These costs can consume a fifth of everything recovered. |
Replacement cost
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
|---|
| Rebuild the technology | $2,200 | What it would cost a competent competitor to build the same product from nothing. Risk: Include the dead ends. A rebuild hits many of the same failed approaches you did. |
| Rebuild the brand | $700 | Marketing spend needed to reach the same level of awareness and trust. Risk: Reputation built over years cannot be bought in months at any price. |
| Rehire the team | $900 | Recruitment fees plus the cost of the months new hires spend getting up to speed. Risk: Ignores whether comparable people are even available in your market. |
| Recreate data and customers | $500 | What it would cost to acquire the same customer base and accumulate the same proprietary data. Risk: Often the largest and most understated component, because some datasets simply cannot be bought. |
| Licences and approvals | $250 | Cost of obtaining the same regulatory permissions, certifications, and licences. Risk: The real barrier is usually time, not money. A two-year approval cannot be bought faster. |
Dividend discount model
| Input | Value | Definition and principal risk |
|---|
| Next year dividend per share | $1 | The cash dividend each share is expected to pay over the coming year. Risk: Use the forward expectation, not the trailing payment. |
| Required return on equity | 11.0% | The annual return a shareholder needs to hold this share rather than something safer. Risk: For dividend-paying financial businesses this is usually 8–14%. |
| Dividend growth rate | 4.0% | How fast the dividend grows each year, forever. Risk: Must stay below the required return. If it does not, the formula returns nonsense and the constant-growth assumption is simply wrong. |
4Derivation of value — Comparable company multiples
Market approach, applied as a primary method. Indicated value $18,347, within a range of $14,677 to $22,016.
| Line | Working | Amount | Reasoning |
|---|
| EV / Revenue | revenue 12,000 × 2.2x → EV 26,400, less net debt | $24,200 | Revenue multiples ignore whether revenue converts to cash. Only defensible when peers share a similar margin structure. |
| EV / EBITDA | EBITDA 2,400 × 9.5x → EV 22,800, less net debt | $20,600 | The workhorse multiple. Capital-structure neutral, but blind to capex intensity — two businesses at the same EBITDA can have very different real cash generation. |
| Price / Earnings | net income 1,500 × 16x | $24,000 | P/E is already an equity value, so no net-debt adjustment. It is distorted by leverage and by tax position. |
| Average of selected multiples | 3 methods | $22,933 | |
| Marketability and control adjustment | less 20% lack of marketability | $-4,587 | Public comparables are liquid and quoted at minority prices. A private stake cannot be sold in a day, which is why a discount for lack of marketability applies — typically 15–35%. |
| Indicated equity value | | $18,347 | |
| Method assumes | The comparables are genuinely comparable in growth, margin, risk, and capital intensity. |
|---|
| Method breaks when | Multiples import the market's mood along with its logic. A peer set priced in a bubble prices your company in a bubble. |
|---|
| Weight in reconciliation | 3 |
|---|
Discounted cash flow
Income approach, applied as a primary method. Indicated value $22,391, within a range of $18,362 to $28,460.
| Line | Working | Amount | Reasoning |
|---|
| Cost of equity (CAPM build-up) | 4.2% risk free + 1.25 beta × 5.5% equity risk premium + 2.5% size + 1.5% company-specific | 15.1% | Beta scales market risk. The size and company-specific premiums exist because a private, concentrated business is riskier than the index and CAPM alone does not capture that. |
| After-tax cost of debt | 8.0% × (1 − 22.0%) | 6.2% | Interest is deductible, so the real cost to the firm is net of tax shield. |
| Weighted average cost of capital | 70% equity × 15.1% + 30% debt × 6.2% | 12.4% | This is the blended return capital providers demand. It becomes the discount rate for unlevered cash flow. |
| Year 1 free cash flow | revenue 14,160 (18.0% growth) × 20.0% margin → EBITDA 2,832; less D&A 566, tax at 22.0%, add back D&A, less capex 708 and working capital 216 | $1,410 | Unlevered free cash flow: what the business generates before paying any lender or shareholder. D&A is subtracted to get the tax right, then added back because it is not a cash outflow. |
| Year 2 free cash flow | revenue 16,249 (14.8% growth) × 21.0% margin → EBITDA 3,412; less D&A 650, tax at 22.0%, add back D&A, less capex 812 and working capital 209 | $1,783 | |
| Year 3 free cash flow | revenue 18,117 (11.5% growth) × 22.0% margin → EBITDA 3,986; less D&A 725, tax at 22.0%, add back D&A, less capex 906 and working capital 187 | $2,176 | |
| Year 4 free cash flow | revenue 19,612 (8.2% growth) × 23.0% margin → EBITDA 4,511; less D&A 784, tax at 22.0%, add back D&A, less capex 981 and working capital 149 | $2,561 | |
| Year 5 free cash flow | revenue 20,592 (5.0% growth) × 24.0% margin → EBITDA 4,942; less D&A 824, tax at 22.0%, add back D&A, less capex 1,030 and working capital 98 | $2,908 | |
| Present value of forecast cash flows | discounted at 12.4%, mid-year convention | $7,866 | Mid-year convention assumes cash arrives evenly through the year rather than all on 31 December. It raises value by roughly half a year of discounting. |
| Terminal value (Gordon growth) | year 5 FCF 2,908 × (1 + 2.5%) ÷ (12.4% − 2.5%) | $30,038 | Everything after the forecast horizon, collapsed into one number. Terminal growth above long-run nominal GDP implies the company eventually becomes the economy — keep it below roughly 3%. |
| Present value of terminal value | × discount factor 0.5568 | $16,725 | Terminal value is 68% of enterprise value. Above 75% means the forecast period is doing almost no work and the answer rests on two assumptions. |
| Enterprise value | PV of forecast + PV of terminal | $24,591 | |
| Less net debt | debt 3,000 less cash 800 | $-2,200 | Enterprise value belongs to all capital providers. Lenders are paid first, so subtract debt and add surplus cash to reach the shareholders' claim. |
| Equity value | | $22,391 | |
Sensitivity of indicated equity value
| WACC / terminal growth | 1.5% | 2.0% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.5% |
|---|
| 10.9% | 24,601 | 25,743 | 27,021 | 28,460 | 30,092 |
|---|
| 11.7% | 22,510 | 23,460 | 24,513 | 25,688 | 27,007 |
|---|
| 12.4% | 20,711 | 21,511 | 22,391 | 23,364 | 24,446 |
|---|
| 13.2% | 19,149 | 19,828 | 20,571 | 21,388 | 22,288 |
|---|
| 13.9% | 17,779 | 18,362 | 18,995 | 19,687 | 20,445 |
|---|
| Method assumes | Cash flows are predictable, the discount rate reflects real risk, and the business survives to terminal year. |
|---|
| Method breaks when | Terminal value routinely carries 60–80% of the answer, so small changes in g or WACC swing the result violently. |
|---|
| Weight in reconciliation | 3 |
|---|
First Chicago (scenario weighted)
Forward-looking approach, applied as a primary method. Indicated value $8,865, within a range of $5,319 to $14,184.
| Line | Working | Amount | Reasoning |
|---|
| Upside scenario | exit 120,000 ÷ 4.48 discount factor, weighted 15% | $4,014 | The outcome that justifies venture capital existing. Low probability, dominates the weighted answer. |
| Base scenario | exit 40,000 ÷ 4.48 discount factor, weighted 50% | $4,460 | A solid but unspectacular outcome — usually a trade sale at a modest multiple. |
| Downside scenario | exit 5,000 ÷ 4.48 discount factor, weighted 35% | $390 | Acquihire, asset sale, or zero. Being explicit here is the point of the method. |
| Probability check | 100% total | OK | |
| Probability-weighted value | | $8,865 | |
| Method assumes | Three genuinely distinct outcome paths with probabilities that sum to 100%. |
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| Method breaks when | Probability estimates are unfalsifiable. The method is honest about structure, not about accuracy. |
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| Weight in reconciliation | 3 |
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Precedent transactions
Market approach, applied as a primary method. Indicated value $21,590, within a range of $18,352 to $24,828.
| Line | Working | Amount | Reasoning |
|---|
| Transaction EV / EBITDA | EBITDA 2,400 × 11.5x | $27,600 | Deal multiples already include the control premium a buyer paid for the right to run the business. |
| Less net debt | | $-2,200 | |
| Equity value at deal multiple | | $25,400 | |
| Synergy haircut | less 15% | $-3,810 | Strategic buyers pay for synergies specific to them. Unless your buyer has the same synergies, that portion of the multiple is not available to you. |
| Indicated equity value | | $21,590 | |
| Method assumes | Recent deals for similar assets, disclosed at a level you can normalise. |
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| Method breaks when | Transaction multiples embed control premiums and buyer-specific synergies you may never realise. |
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| Weight in reconciliation | 3 |
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Venture capital method
Forward-looking approach, applied as a primary method. Indicated value $12,503, within a range of $7,502 to $18,754.
| Line | Working | Amount | Reasoning |
|---|
| Exit value | exit-year revenue 40,000 × 3x | $120,000 | The exit multiple should reflect what a mature version of this company trades at, not what today's hottest comparable trades at. |
| Return multiple required | (1 + 40%) ^ 5 years | 5.38x | A 40% target IRR over five years demands a 5.4x return. Venture funds target this because most portfolio companies return nothing. |
| Post-money value today | 120,000 ÷ 5.38 | $22,312 | |
| Adjusted for future dilution | × (1 − 35%) | $14,503 | Later rounds dilute today's investor. Ignoring this systematically overstates what can be paid now. |
| Less this round's investment | 2,000 | $-2,000 | Pre-money is post-money minus the new cash going in. The distinction decides the founder's ownership. |
| Indicated pre-money value | | $12,503 | |
| Method assumes | A credible exit value, exit year, target return, and expected future dilution. |
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| Method breaks when | Target IRR and exit multiple are chosen, not observed. The method mostly restates the investor's mandate. |
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| Weight in reconciliation | 3 |
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5Reconciliation and conclusion
| Method | Applicability | Low | Indicated | High | Weight |
|---|
| Comparable company multiples | Primary | $14,677 | $18,347 | $22,016 | 3 |
| Discounted cash flow | Primary | $18,362 | $22,391 | $28,460 | 3 |
| First Chicago (scenario weighted) | Primary | $5,319 | $8,865 | $14,184 | 3 |
| Precedent transactions | Primary | $18,352 | $21,590 | $24,828 | 3 |
| Venture capital method | Primary | $7,502 | $12,503 | $18,754 | 3 |
Comparable company multiples
Discounted cash flow
First Chicago (scenario weighted)
Precedent transactions
Venture capital method
$0$28,460
Weighted indicated equity value$16,739Indicated range $12,842 to $21,648
Weights reflect the applicability of each method to the subject's stage and sector. Weighting is a matter of judgement and is not derived from a statistical procedure. Where the spread between the low and high indications exceeds approximately 60% of the midpoint, the methods have not converged and a single point value should not be represented to a counterparty; the range and the reason for the divergence should be presented instead.
6Capitalisation and distribution of proceeds
Prior rounds are historical prices agreed under the conditions of their day. They are recorded here for context and because they will be used as anchors in negotiation; they are not evidence of present value. All amounts in USD thousands.
Funding history
| Round | Instrument | Date | Invested | Pre-money | Post-money | Stake | Step-up |
|---|
| Seed | Seed | 2023-06-01 | $1,500 | $6,000 | $7,500 | 20.0% | — |
| Series A | Series A | 2025-03-01 | $4,000 | $18,000 | $22,000 | 18.2% | 2.40x |
| Total raised | | | $5,500 | | $22,000 | | |
Ownership at the valuation date
| Holder | Class | Invested | Stake | Pro-rata share of concluded value |
|---|
| Founders and common | Common | — | 56.0% | $9,368 |
| Seed option pool | Option pool | — | 6.2% | $1,041 |
| Seed | Preferred | $1,500 | 15.5% | $2,602 |
| Series A option pool | Option pool | — | 4.1% | $685 |
| Series A | Preferred | $4,000 | 18.2% | $3,043 |
Dilution arithmetic
| Line | Working | Amount | Reasoning |
|---|
| Opening position | before any external funding | 100.0% | Ownership is tracked as percentages rather than share counts. The arithmetic is identical and it avoids the false precision of invented share numbers. |
| Seed — post-money valuation | pre-money 6,000 + investment 1,500 | $7,500 | Post-money is what the whole company is worth immediately after the cash lands. Pre-money is what it was worth the moment before. The difference is exactly the cheque. |
| Seed — investor stake | 1,500 ÷ 7,500 | 20.00% | Ownership is always calculated on the post-money figure. Dividing by the pre-money overstates the investor's stake and is the most common arithmetic error in term-sheet discussions. |
| Seed — option pool created pre-money | 10.0% of the post-round company, carved out before the investment | 10.00% | Creating the pool inside the pre-money means existing holders alone pay for it. The incoming investor gets their stated percentage on top of a company that has already been diluted. This is a price reduction disguised as a governance item. |
| Seed — dilution factor on existing holders | (1 − 10.0%) × (1 − 20.0%) | 0.7200x | Every existing holding is multiplied by this. Dilution is proportional: it does not change who owns more than whom, only how much each owns. |
| Founders and common after Seed | | 72.00% | |
| Series A — post-money valuation | pre-money 18,000 + investment 4,000 | $22,000 | Post-money is what the whole company is worth immediately after the cash lands. Pre-money is what it was worth the moment before. The difference is exactly the cheque. |
| Series A — investor stake | 4,000 ÷ 22,000 | 18.18% | Ownership is always calculated on the post-money figure. Dividing by the pre-money overstates the investor's stake and is the most common arithmetic error in term-sheet discussions. |
| Series A — option pool created pre-money | 5.0% of the post-round company, carved out before the investment | 5.00% | Creating the pool inside the pre-money means existing holders alone pay for it. The incoming investor gets their stated percentage on top of a company that has already been diluted. This is a price reduction disguised as a governance item. |
| Series A — dilution factor on existing holders | (1 − 5.0%) × (1 − 18.2%) | 0.7773x | Every existing holding is multiplied by this. Dilution is proportional: it does not change who owns more than whom, only how much each owns. |
| Founders and common after Series A | | 55.96% | |
| Series A — step-up on the prior post-money | pre-money 18,000 ÷ prior post-money 7,500 | 2.40x | The step-up is the price change between rounds, not a measure of value created. Both figures are negotiated prices. |
| Total capital raised | 2 rounds | $5,500 | |
| Founders and common — closing stake | | 55.96% | |
| Seed option pool — closing stake | | 6.22% | |
| Seed — closing stake | | 15.55% | |
| Series A option pool — closing stake | | 4.09% | |
| Series A — closing stake | | 18.18% | |
| Total ownership | must equal 100% | 100.00% | |
Distribution of the concluded equity value
Seniority basis: pari passu, all preferred rank equally. Common shareholders, founders, and option holders receive nothing until the preference stack of $5,500 is satisfied, which is 33% of the concluded equity value.
| Class | Terms | Invested | Stake | Low | Concluded | High | Return |
|---|
| Founders and common | | — | 56.0% | $6,048 | $8,713 | $12,072 | — |
| Seed option pool | | — | 6.2% | $672 | $968 | $1,341 | — |
| Seed (converts) | 1x non-participating | $1,500 | 15.5% | $1,680 | $2,420 | $3,353 | 1.61x |
| Series A option pool | | — | 4.1% | $442 | $637 | $882 | — |
| Series A | 1x non-participating | $4,000 | 18.2% | $4,000 | $4,000 | $4,000 | 1.00x |
Waterfall arithmetic
| Line | Working | Amount | Reasoning |
|---|
| Equity value available for distribution | the concluded value from the reconciliation | $16,739 | The waterfall answers a different question from the valuation. Valuation asks what the company is worth; the waterfall asks who receives it. |
| Seed — liquidation preference | 1,500 invested × 1x | $1,500 | The preference is the amount this class is contractually entitled to receive before common shareholders receive anything at all. |
| Series A — liquidation preference | 4,000 invested × 1x | $4,000 | |
| Total preference stack | | $5,500 | |
| Seed — conversion test | converted outcome 2,420 versus preference 1,500 | Converts | A non-participating holder chooses whichever is worth more: take the fixed preference, or convert to common and share pro rata. Because conversions change what is left for everyone else, this test is repeated until the choices stop changing. |
| Series A — conversion test | converted outcome 4,000 versus preference 4,000 | Takes preference | |
| Preference actually paid | pari passu — shared in proportion to preference amounts if proceeds fall short | $4,000 | Pari passu means all preferred rank equally. If proceeds are short, everyone is cut back proportionally rather than in order of arrival. |
| Residual available to common and converted holders | 16,739 − 4,000 | $12,739 | |
| Founders and common — share of residual | 55.96% ÷ 81.82% participating × 12,739 | $8,713 | |
| Seed option pool — share of residual | 6.22% ÷ 81.82% participating × 12,739 | $968 | |
| Seed — share of residual | 15.55% ÷ 81.82% participating × 12,739 | $2,420 | |
| Series A option pool — share of residual | 4.09% ÷ 81.82% participating × 12,739 | $637 | |
| Founders and common — total received | | $8,713 | |
| Seed option pool — total received | | $968 | |
| Seed — total received | 1.61x money returned | $2,420 | |
| Series A option pool — total received | | $637 | |
| Series A — total received | 1.00x money returned | $4,000 | |
| Total distributed | must equal the equity value above | $16,739 | |
This schedule does not model anti-dilution ratchets, discounts or caps on convertible instruments, accruing dividends, pay-to-play or pull-up provisions, management carve-outs, or option strike prices. Each can move the outcome to common materially and must be checked against the executed documents.
7Limiting conditions
- This analysis is indicative. It is not an appraisal, valuation opinion, or fairness opinion, and has not been prepared under any recognised valuation standard by a credentialed valuer.
- Financial information has been accepted as presented. No audit, review, site visit, or independent verification of assets, liabilities, contracts, or forecasts has been performed.
- Market multiples, comparable companies, precedent transactions, and regional averages are inputs selected by the preparer. No independent market data source is embedded in this document.
- Forecasts represent expectations at the valuation date. Actual results will differ, and the difference is frequently material.
- The conclusion is expressed as a range. Any single figure extracted from that range without its context misrepresents the analysis.
- Transaction terms including liquidation preferences, participation rights, anti-dilution protection, earn-outs, escrow, and warranties are not reflected. These routinely affect proceeds to a shareholder more than the headline value does.
- This document does not constitute investment, legal, tax, or accounting advice, nor an offer or solicitation in respect of any security.
- The analysis speaks only as at the valuation date and has not been updated for subsequent events.
| Prepared by | — | Signature | |
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| Role | — | Date | 2026-08-08 |
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| Prepared for | — |
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| Status | Draft — for discussion |
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